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 THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND THE 
CHRONIC CHALLENGE OF COST CONTROL 
 
By: Isaac D. Buck† 
 
Thank you, Derek, and thank you all for having me. First of all, 
I would like to congratulate the Journal on a wonderful symposium 
topic this year, a theme that is uniquely newsworthy. Nonetheless, 
considering this is the focus of much of my waking hours, scholarship, 
and teaching, I may be biased. But I thank you for bringing together 
stellar voices to have this conversation and for providing a platform 
for such a vital topic.  
In my talk, I’d like to move beyond focusing solely on the 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), or even specific health insurance 
reforms, and widen the analysis. Instead of speaking on the 
constitutional law implications of litigation surrounding the ACA, I’ll 
be focusing on one of the most daunting health policy challenges 
facing the American health care system in 2017. Nonetheless 
recognizing that the symposium is organized around the impact of 
NFIB v. Sebelius,1 I’ll be sure to wrap the case into later comments. 
But in my estimation, the debates of the day, that focus both on the 
recently abandoned American Health Care Act (“AHCA”) and the 
battered and embattled ACA, avoid a necessary holistic discussion of 
the American health care system. In some ways, the reform debate has 
been co-opted: instead of talking about existential challenges within 
American health care, the extended health reform debate has focused 
instead on the ACA’s so-called “government takeover.” 
This debate has replayed for seven years; it has been focused 
on the effectiveness of websites, on the increasing amounts of 
premiums in the individual marketplace without a corresponding 
discussion of the extensive subsidies that support them, and the debate 
regarding, of course, whether Obamacare and the ACA are in fact the 
same thing. Following the collapse of the AHCA effort, national media 
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characterized it as a political failure of the Trump administration while 
noting that Obamacare—without specifying what specific part—was 
still tenuous.  
But these debates and narratives obscure the entirety of what 
the ACA does. Sure, individual markets have struggled, including my 
home market of Knoxville, Tennessee, but characterizing the entire 
law as “failing” is not only misleading, it’s untrue. This is the law that 
established the rights of 26-year-olds to stay on their parents’ plans, 
that outlawed preexisting condition discrimination, that provided 
funding for evidence-based medicine and fraud and abuse 
enforcement, that sought to increase reimbursement efficiencies in 
Medicare, and provided free preventive and contraceptive care to 
millions of previously-uninsured Americans.  
I grant that the ACA is complicated and nuanced and some 
pieces have not been as successful as anticipated, but by focusing on 
the political fights over websites, we have allowed some of the ACA’s 
strongest attributes regarding cost control to flounder. As a result, we 
have left millions of Americans unaware of the good that the ACA is 
doing, and has done, in their lives largely until recently. And in this 
environment, it is impossible to have productive policy debates 
focused on America’s big problems. Nonetheless, it is true that the 
failure of the ACA to “break through” and provide clear tangible 
positives in citizens’ lives, of which they are keenly aware, could 
constitute a real critique of the messaging of the law. Health care 
delivery and finance has no shortage of complexity. 
Which brings us to the AHCA, a plan which, in the end, had 
few supporters. Indeed, the AHCA focused its energy on shrinking and 
fundamentally altering two things: the individual marketplace and 
Medicaid. The debates focused on whether 23 million Americans—
who have been insured under the ACA—should be kicked off their 
health insurance plans by 2026,2 whether Medicaid should be 
fundamentally remade to incorporate work requirements and cease 
being an entitlement program for many of the nation’s poor, and 
whether health care reform as a policy matter could work without an 
individual mandate. As you may have guessed, I thought these reforms 
under the AHCA were misguided and doomed to fail, and indeed, they 
did in the end, last week.  
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From a policy perspective, an individual market without a 
mandate would produce sicker, more expensive insurance pools. 
Medicaid without secure funding would result in deep cuts in coverage 
and access, essentially changing a program that has become a lifeline 
for many (including children and the elderly), and capping the tax 
subsidies given to those who cannot afford insurance would result in 
fewer people signing up for coverage, more expensive premiums, and 
a growing number of uninsured individuals showing up in the nation’s 
emergency rooms.  
As the New York Times stated, the AHCA was a “bill in search 
of a problem” and that it reflected “no shared vision” of what it wanted 
to achieve.3 Its reforms were likely to worsen health coverage, access, 
and outcomes. Perhaps it was the newest attempt at delivering a death 
blow to Medicaid, which covers more than 70 million Americans and 
pays for nearly half the births in this country every year.4 But it, like 
so many other health reform efforts before it, never made it into law, 
nor even to the upper chamber of Capitol Hill. Given the omnipresence 
of these debates, we can talk about arguments over the reforms and the 
potential threats they create, but for the remainder of my talk, I want 
to speak more specifically about America’s existential challenge:  the 
challenge of the cost of health care in the United States in 2017.  
First, by larger, I don’t mean more consequential, particularly 
for the millions of Americans who were at risk of losing insurance 
under the AHCA or other repeal efforts. Instead, I mean a cost 
challenge that is so daunting that it will likely inhibit the success of 
any health care reform effort in the United States in the near future. 
Indeed, it has hamstrung the ACA as well; this is because the pricing 
and utilization challenges in the U.S. swamp the ability of health 
reform efforts, like the ACA and AHCA, to achieve real cost control. 
If one could imagine the cost challenge as a chronic condition, after 
sustaining a number of body blows, the ACA treats the symptoms of 
the condition while only limitedly impacting the overall cost of health 
care. Nonetheless, the AHCA would have exacerbated them, but in 
order for an American health care reform effort to find political 
purchase, I submit that the underlying cost challenge must be directly 
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and forcefully addressed. Besides being complex, what makes the cost 
challenge so daunting is that there is seemingly little political will to 
directly address it.  
Over just the last two years, stories of the prices of Mylan’s 
EpiPen5 and Martin Shkreli’s Daraprim6 hit the national news and 
sparked outrage. Americans, even those with insurance, still too often 
face surprising health care bills after coming home from a hospital 
stay. Employers face increasingly difficult decisions about coverage 
for their employees. Insurance companies are losing leverage in the 
marketplace. But none of these stories and pressures have resulted in 
congressional action in Washington on the price of health care.  
Instead, the rising prices of health care have been blamed on 
the ACA. As a result, the larger debate then centers on the specific 
policy prescriptions of the ACA or its replacement and not on the 
fundamental problem: that American health care is simply too 
expensive. No amount of tax subsidy or increased access is going to 
address that problem. If Americans really are serious about health care 
reform, they need to stop ignoring the elephant in the room, to 
paraphrase David Wolman in the context of drug pricing, that “prices 
are too damn high.”7 And where the ACA sought to make inroads in 
cost control, political hostility has wounded it.  
So now, on to the numbers. Americans spend about 18 percent 
of our gross domestic product (“GDP”) on health care, totaling well 
over three trillion dollars each year.8 We spend the most per capita on 
health care of any country in the world by a large margin, far outpacing 
our peers in the United Kingdom and Australia, which both spend just 
under 10 percent of their GDPs, respectively.9 Expressed in per capita 
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terms, we spend about $9,000 per year per capita on health care10 
whereas Switzerland spends about $6,800,11 Germany about $5,100,12 
and Australia less than half, at $4,200.13  
This is not a new challenge, but America’s expenditure crisis 
has intensified in recent years. As recently as 1980, America spent just 
8 percent of its GDP on health care.14 This number rose in the 1990s 
and 2000s.15 It is a crisis that has sharply intensified over the last 35 
years. Health care expenditures are now increasingly eating into other 
goods and services Americans can purchase and fund, like education, 
defense, and travel. Of course, one could ask, “what else would you 
want to spend 18 percent of your GDP on?” But it would indeed be a 
different question if our elevated budget bought better health care for 
our citizens.  
Unfortunately, this lofty budget does not translate into 
increased quality. Compared to its peers, America still lags behind on 
a number of key quality metrics. According to recent data from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”), the United States is above average on infant mortality.16 
And America is 27th out of 43 OECD countries on life expectancy.17 
Further, another survey, completed by the Commonwealth Fund, ranks 
the health systems of eleven countries.18 A survey published in 2014 
by the Fund noted that the U.S. health system “underperforms relative 
to other countries on most dimensions of performance,” and the survey 
had America ranked last on its quality metrics,19 just as it did in 2010, 
2007, 2006, and 2004.20 Recent studies have also concluded that 
America has few practicing physicians and doctor consultations per 
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System Compares Internationally, The COMMW. FUND (June 16, 2014), 
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19 See id.  
20 See id. 
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capita compared to the OECD average,21 and, of course, without 
adequate numbers of physicians, particularly in primary care, the 
underlying problem intensifies.  
There are two contributors to the expenditure challenge facing 
American health care: utilization and pricing. The utilization problem 
is due to America’s providers administering too much health care, and 
the pricing challenge is due to the excessive costs of America’s health 
care services, drugs, and equipment. In short, in the United States, 
American providers perform too many surgeries, administer too many 
tests, and intervene too frequently—and much of what providers do is 
too expensive.  
On the first point, American health care is dogged by 
overutilization, of which I have written before, or overtreatment, to 
which it is frequently referred. In trying to explain why the American 
health care system administers too many health care services, one 
could examine numerous causes: perhaps it is reimbursement 
incentives, malpractice litigation or defensive medicine, demanding 
patients, fragmented health care delivery systems and medical silo-
ization, or expensive technological advancement. Personally, I think 
all probably play a role.  
Historically, America has been unable, first, to adequately 
pressure physicians to care about cost efficiency and, even more than 
that, has inexplicably built a reimbursement structure through 
Medicare, at least historically, that has incentivized overtreatment. 
Over 50 plus years, when providers have performed additional tests 
and arguably unnecessary surgeries, they have earned more in 
Medicare’s fee-for-service reimbursement regime. Further, providers 
have been pressured to perform additional screens on patients who 
may have complicated presentation due to a fear of malpractice 
litigation and because the patient may be demanding it, and, honestly, 
because practicing medicine is intensely difficult, and when providers 
are faced with a patient who presents complicated problems, they may 
want to double-check. Uncertainty causes anxiety, and anxiety seeks a 
definitive answer to a complicated medical problem.  
Paraphrasing author Shannon Brownlee, a provider seeking a 
definitive answer is likely to rely on additional screening machinery, 
especially if the patient wants it, and especially when the provider’s 
time is tight.21 Additionally, American health care is persistently 
                                                          
21 See Anderson & Squires, supra note 8. 
21 See Shannon Brownlee, Why Your Doctor Has No Time To See You, NEWSWEEK (April 16, 
2012), http://www.newsweek.com/why-your-doctor-has-no-time-see-you-63949.  
 
104 UNIV OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. XI No. 2] 
fragmented and siloed. Providers are financially incentivized to 
specialize further and further because the specialties that require 
additional training and work often are the most financially lucrative. 
American patients often see a number of providers without having 
adequate primary care—the country faces a shortfall numbering 
somewhere between 46,000 and 90,000 physicians by 2025.22 As a 
result, care is often duplicated and wasted, and inefficiencies permeate 
the system.  
Finally, somewhat counterintuitively, technological 
advancement leads to overtreatment as well. Hospitals that have 
recently acquired expensive top-of-the-line machinery feel compelled 
to use it to pay for it. The more they acquire, the more they have to 
use. And this is borne out by the numbers in the surveys that I 
mentioned before. America does well at screening for cervical cancer, 
for instance, but terrible in treating childhood asthma, reflecting great 
screening capabilities, which is highly expensive, but poor primary and 
preventive care, which is largely inexpensive. 
In addition to the overtreatment challenge which largely drives 
excess costs in government insurance program of Medicare, American 
health care is hamstrung by astronomical costs because the prices of 
health care in the United States—that is, the initial prices of drugs, 
services, and hospital stays—are more expensive in this country than 
anywhere else in the world. Reporting by the New York Times 
particularly recent work by Elizabeth Rosenthal, has shined a light on 
this problem.23  
According to Rosenthal, the average colonoscopy in the U.S. 
costs $1,200; it is priced at $600 in Switzerland.24 The average hip 
replacement in the U.S. is over $40,000, and in Spain, it is $8,000.25 
The cost of a prescription of Lipitor is $120.26 In New Zealand, it is 
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25 See id. 
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$6.27 An American angiogram costs $900; in Canada, it costs $35.28 
An MRI in America is $1,100 on average and in the Netherlands, it is 
about $300.29 In addition to the international differences, prices 
between and among hospitals, even some in the same region or 
community, vary wildly, seemingly without any regard for quality or 
for service.  
Even more inexplicably, the opaque pricing structure within 
American health care actually often leads hospitals to charge those 
without insurance more, at least initially, as they do not have the 
benefit of the insurance company’s discounts. There are a number of 
examples of perverse pricing within Medicare’s reimbursement 
structure. For instance, in a recent paper, I discussed pricing 
differences between the two drugs of Avastin and Lucentis,30 both 
drugs that treat age-related Macular Degeneration (“AMD”). Millions 
of Americans are affected by AMD each year and, as a result, of 
course, many of them are elderly Americans; as a result, Medicare 
covers both drugs without limitation. 
Interestingly, both drugs of Lucentis and Avastin are 
manufactured by the same company, Genentech, and after numerous 
studies, both have been found to be basically clinically equivalent in 
their effectiveness against AMD.31 Seemingly, the only clinical 
difference is that one of the drugs is Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) approved for AMD treatment, and the other one is used in an 
off-label manner, but is commonly used to treat AMD.32  
The only other difference, of course, is the prices of the drugs. 
Avastin is $50 per dose,33 and Lucentis is $2,000 per dose.34 After 
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30 See Isaac D. Buck, The Cost of High Prices Embedding an Ethic of Expense into the Standard 
of Care, 58 B.C. L. REV. 101 (2017). 
31 See Marilyn Haddrill, Lucentis Vs. Avastin: A Macular Degeneration Treatment Controversy, 
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32 See id. 
33 See Peter Whoriskey & Dan Keating, An effective eye drug is available for $50. But many 
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Good?, THE WASH. POST (Dec. 10 2015), 
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discounts, Medicare pays about $26 for Avastin,35 and about $1,900 
for Lucentis.36 This is an unfortunate enough development, of course, 
but Medicare makes it worse. Under Medicare’s Part B reimbursement 
scheme—because the drugs are administered in doctor’s offices—
Medicare pays ophthalmologists the average sales price (ASP) of the 
drug plus 6 percent.37 It is known as “ASP plus six.” As a result, 
doctors who rely on Avastin can make about $3 on the administration 
of the drug, whereas doctors who rely on Lucentis can make about 
$120, which is 6 percent of $2,000.38 
A CMS effort to change this reimbursement mechanism in the 
waning days of the Obama administration was recently abandoned.22 
Instead, this enduring reimbursement scheme not only financially 
incentivizes doctors to rely on the most expensive drug for treatment 
of their patients, which is why it is no small miracle that 56 percent of 
all ophthalmologists choose the cheaper Avastin to treat AMD,39 but it 
indirectly incentivizes drug companies to price their drugs even higher 
than they otherwise would.  
Finally, in health care, the power of the consumer is nearly 
nonexistent. Patients do not reliably act like consumers and operate at 
a pervasive information gulf. As Carl Schneider and Mark Hall have 
noted, patients are boundedly rational in every aspect of a clinical 
scenario.23 On top of this, they are often in pain or frightened. On top 
of these challenges, typical consumer-protection mechanisms are 
simply inapplicable in the health care context: in no other industry 
could a consumer expect to not know the price of the goods she 
purchases before paying for the services.  
Thus, American health care system then is both uniquely 
expensive and generally mediocre, and although the debates over 
access and insurance status dominate headlines today, insufficient day-
to-day attention has been paid to universal cost and quality problems. 
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But that is not to say that reforms in this area have not been attempted 
and have succeeded. One need look no further than March 23, 2010.40 
By striving for universal coverage, the ACA tried to begin to address 
these challenges: examples I will focus on here are cost-shifting and 
negotiating leverage.   
First, the ACA attempted to address cost-shifting, which is a 
driver of excessive pricing. Cost-shifting stands for the reality that 
hospitals will charge those with insurance more to cover the costs for 
those who come to the emergency room without insurance and who 
cannot pay. Under the ACA, if all individuals are covered by insurance 
(even if the insurance is Medicaid that typically has relatively low 
comparative reimbursement rates for hospitals and providers), then 
hospitals would not have as powerful an incentive to cost-shift than 
they do when a substantial percentage of the population is uninsured. 
If the ACA succeeded in extending coverage universally then, 
theoretically, the cost-shifting impetus would have been removed or 
sated, and prices of health care—the prices of hospital services, for 
instance—could have theoretically dropped or at least stabilized.  
Second, the ACA sought to address the negotiating leverage 
problem. One of the challenges of American health care is its 
fragmented delivery system. By forcing millions of Americans into an 
individual marketplace through the individual mandate, the ACA was 
broadening its risk pools and deepening its coverage, which gives 
insurance companies more leverage in negotiating with hospitals 
because the company represents a larger network of beneficiaries. For 
example, if insurance companies represent a substantial chunk of the 
market in a given state, then the insurance company may have more 
leverage in its negotiations over prices with hospitals. Hospitals must 
be willing to deal, and, theoretically, the discounts steepen.  
The negotiation over prices that insurance companies pay often 
boils down to who has more leverage, the hospital or the insurance 
company. When more potential patients are represented by the 
insurance company, then it often has more leverage. Adversely, when 
the hospital consolidates market power, prices rise. This is borne out 
by numerous studies—including a study published late last year by the 
Health Care Pricing Project, which found that hospital prices in 
monopoly markets were 15 percent higher than those in markets with 
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four or more hospitals.41 Given what we know about monopolies and 
pricing, that finding should not be surprising.  
Further, when hospitals merge, prices increase. And America’s 
health care industry is rapidly consolidating. According to Deloitte in 
2014, “if horizontal consolidation continues in the coming decade, … 
likely only 50 percent of [2014’s] unique health systems are expected 
to remain.”42 Of course the consolidation of the marketplace has made 
the pricing problem worse.  
And this is where NFIB v. Sebelius—the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ruling that the individual mandate was a tax and thus permissible, but 
that the Medicaid expansion was unduly coercive, and had to be 
voluntary—becomes important.43 In the decision, Chief Justice 
Roberts both saved the ACA, but wounded its operation—particularly 
as it relates to cost control—by allowing states to opt out of Medicaid 
expansion. In this opinion, the court not only limited its operation of 
the ACA, but it destroyed one of the ACA’s intended tools to control 
the cost of health care:  its effort to address cost-shifting. Following 
the Supreme Court’s decision, and with more people uninsured in 
states that did not expand their Medicaid program, the cost-shifting 
problem continued, unabated. This was exacerbated by the proposal to 
cut other funding to hospitals, including, like Professor Huberfeld 
mentioned, disproportionate share payments, although some of the 
cuts have been delayed. 
Nonetheless, in many rural parts of the country, the NFIB 
decision has hastened the downfall of hospitals facing tremendous 
budgetary shortfalls, putting in place a future of decreasing federal 
subsidies and limited insurance coverage in states that do not expand 
Medicaid. Particularly in my former home state of Georgia, eight rural 
hospitals have closed since 2010.44 As a result, the solution to the cost-
shifting problem was blunted in these states. From a global cost 
perspective, this is the ultimate result of the Medicaid decision in 
NFIB. And politically, the Affordable Care Act has suffered because 
of rising premiums and an unsteady individual marketplace. 
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But again, had parts of the law been implemented as intended, 
perhaps these marketplaces would have been more functional. As an 
example, an important part of the ACA was known as the risk corridor 
adjustment program whereby the Department Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”) from 2014 through 2016 would spread the risk 
among insurers who participated in the marketplaces at the end of each 
year.45 This was seen as a safety net for insurance companies, in the 
event they took on patients that ended up being riskier than the pool 
average and more expensive than anticipated.  
Nonetheless, Congress blocked HHS from making these risk 
corridor adjustment payments and ultimately permanently stripped 
them from HHS discretion. As a result, for instance, HHS paid slightly 
more than 12 percent of promised risk corridor payments in 2014.46 
And health insurance companies have sued for the payments. Moda 
Health scored a big win in February of 2017 in the court of federal 
claims, alleging that it was due payments under the risk corridor 
program.47 These moves by a hostile Congress, in addition to the 
continued unprecedented consolidation of health care markets—
perhaps even hastened by the ACA—have intensified the cost problem 
and impacted patients.  
But the ACA has sought to address the rising cost of health care 
on other fronts. The law pushed hospitals to form Accountable Care 
Organizations,48 which are new entities where providers and entities 
share financial risk and are incentivized to achieve cost savings within 
their systems. It also has sought to arm patients with more consumer 
information. Further, by covering preventative care, the ACA seeks to 
avoid the down-the-line expensive consequences that currently face 
too many uninsured Americans. To quote law professor James Kwak, 
this is “significantly better than nothing.”49 As Kwak argues in his blog 
piece, The Problem with Obamacare, the ACA relies on a model that 
utilizes private markets to expand coverage and on broad market-based 
solutions like increased cost-sharing through raised deductibles to 
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deter overuse and risk adjustment provisions to keep insurance 
companies participating.50 But as he ultimately says, “Obamacare is a 
heroic attempt to make the best out of this basic conundrum: we are 
trying to use markets to distribute something that, at the end of the day, 
we don’t want distributed according to market forces.”51 
And due to political hostility, the NFIB case, the widespread 
confusion over what the law does, and the complexity over the subject 
itself, the ACA’s attempt to incorporate market-based solutions—
along with its reliance on the private insurance industry to participate 
in the markets—leaves it unable to adequately address America’s cost 
control problem, and as a larger result, politically vulnerable. It is a 
step in the right direction, but only a step.  
Fragmentation, overtreatment, and excessive pricing continue 
in the American enterprise. As a result, monthly premiums will rise, 
not just for those newly insured in the exchanges but those Medicare 
beneficiaries who pay premiums, and those covered by their employers 
as well. Serious health care reform efforts must address these bedrock 
cost concerns. Without adequate attention to, and focus on, the cost of 
health care, efforts that merely try to insulate further Americans from 
feeling the pain of the cost of health care will be increasingly 
ineffective.  
Until American voters and legislators come up with bold new 
ideas to fix fragmentation that continues to dog the markets, to engage 
in robust antitrust efforts, to better address consolidation, and to 
institute price ceilings, or all-payer rate setting laws, or public options, 
or single payer plans, to hold down the price of the rising prices of 
insurance, until this happens, prices in American health care will 
continue to rise. And without concerted intervention, even with other 
reforms—whether under President Trump or his successor or 
successors—these cost pressures will continue to threaten the nation’s 
leaders’ political success, how the reforms are perceived by the public, 
and the quality and sustainability of American health care well into the 
future.  
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